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AN EFFICIENT MECHANISM TO CONTROL CORRELATED
EXTERNALITIES: REDISTRIBUTIVE TRNASFERS AND
THE COEXISTENCE OF REGIONAL AND GLOBAL
POLLUTION PERMIT MARKETS

ABSTRACT

We compare tradable permit markets and emission taxes as self-enforcing mechanisms to
control correlated externality problems. By "correlated" we mean multiple pollutants that are
jointly produced by a single source but which simultaneously cause differentiated regional and
global externalities (e.g., smog and global warming). By "self-enforcing" we mean mechanisms
that account for the endogeneity that exists between competing jurisdictions in the setting of
environmental policy within a federation of regions. We find that joint domestic and
international permit markets are Pareto efficient, while joint emissions taxes are not.

JEL classification: C72, D62, D78, H41, H77, Q28.

AN EFFICIENT MECHANISM TO CONTROL CORRELATED
EXTERNALITIES: REDISTRIBUTIVE TRANSFERS AND
THE COEXISTENCE OF REGIONAL AND GLOBAL
POLLUTION PERMIT MARKETS

1. Introduction

Mechanisms to control transboundary externalities have received a great deal of attention
in the recent literature, driven by the onset of such global problems as climate change,
atmospheric ozone depletion, and biodiversity loss, as well as problems associated with acid rain.
The mechanisms share two attributes. First, they explicitly account for jurisdictional control
over the policy instruments used to mitigate the externality. For example, regional governments
may be endowed with the authority to independently levy emissions taxes or select abatement
levels while either a central government or the regional governments themselves enact transfers
between the various regions of the federation (c.f., Wellisch, 1994; Silva, 1997; Caplan and
Silva, 1999; Caplan, et aI., 2000). Second, the mechanisms are designed to control emissions of
a single pollutant and therefore address a particular externality problem. In the case of global
warming, for example, sources are assumed to emit solely carbon dioxide (or carbon-equivalent
gases), the aggregate of which affects the welfare or production possibilities of the jurisdictions.
In the case of acid rain, sources emit solely sulfur dioxide, which has jurisdictionally dependent

effects.
In reality, emissions are typically comprised of multiple pollutants that cause

simultaneous localized and global externality problems, and pollution abatement in tum jointly
reduces the flows of these pollutants. For example, the burning of fossil fuels generates carbon
dioxide (C0 2), ozone, nitrogen oxide (NOx), and sulfur dioxide (S02), which create global
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externalities, as well as carbon monoxide (CO), volatile organic compounds, and particulate
matter, which have more localized regional external effects. Destruction of critical wildlife
habitat endangers not only non-migratory species that inhabit the area (the local externality), but
also migratory species that utilize the area's resources as part of a seasonal pattern of global
migration (the global externality).
Abatement technologies, on the other hand, are typically coarse in that they have joint
effects on a multiplicity of pollutants. 1 Consider the case of air pollution control. Jet scrubbers
used to remove dust particles from a gas stream with a dispersed liquid-e.g., in the steel,
chemical, and foundry industries-also remove gaseous pollutants (Brauer and Varma, 1981;
Theodore and Buonicore, 1982). Absorption technologies, which create residual molecular
forces at the surface of solids to attract molecules of gases and vapors, also provide a good
example since they lead to simultaneous removal of dust and gaseous pollutants from a gas
mixture. Examples of this technology include the absorption of S02 , NO x, hydrogen flouride,
and hydrogen chloride, as well as particulate matter from stack gases (ibid).
The facts that large numbers of single sources emit multiple pollutants and current
abatement technologies are coarse imply that a number of important pollution problems are
correlated. It therefore seems appropriate to call such problems "correlated externalities." In the
presence of correlated externalities, previous mechanisms designed to control single externality
problems are therefore incomplete. Their adoption would necessarily create inefficiencies since
the correlated effects of policy instruments would be neglected. This paper provides a first step
in characterizing an efficient mechanism for a situation featuring correlated externalities.

lFine abatement technologies would single out pollutants, enabling the controlling sources to deal with
each pollutant separately.
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The model developed herein draws its motivation from the previous literature on
transboundary pollution control, as well as the literatures on ambient markets for the spatial
control of non-uniformly mixed pollutants (c.f., Ermoliev, et aI., 2000; Lintner and Weersink,
1999; Cabe and Herriges, 1992; Lence, 1991; and Segerson, 1988), the control of multiple
sources and types of pollutants (c.f., Hoel, 1992 and Michaelis, 1992), and the more recent
literature on linking domestic and global tradable permit markets (c.f., Jensen, 2002; Yamin,
2002; and Vis, 2002). It extends the transboundary-pollution literature by accounting for
correlated externalities, and extends the ambient-market literature by accounting for the fact that
spatiality often entails crossing jurisdictional boundaries. We also provide an interesting
comparison of the effectiveness of different policy instruments (taxes vs. transferable permits) in
controlling correlated externalities.
Our results have strong implications for international treaties designed to control global
externality problems. As a prime example, the Seventh Conference of the Parties (COP) to the
UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (October 2001, Marrakech, Morocco), which
was successful in finalizing both the underlying legal texts and the accounting system for the
Kyoto Protocol, considers the control of global carbon-equivalent emissions in isolation from the
control of accompanying pollutants that cause localized externality problems. Yet, these
externality problems are inextricably linked. To efficiently control them, policies developed at
the international level to control climate change must be linked with regional policies aimed at
controlling regional pollution problems.
As we show below, a decentralized mechanism that induces regional governments to
simultaneously and endogenously control the regional and global externalities at efficient levels
requires the governments to condition their regional pollution permit markets on the global
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pollution pennit market established by the international agreement. Using joint emissions taxes
instead of joint pennit markets does not lead to an efficient outcome. In effect, we find that
parties to international agreements such as the Kyoto Protocol can benefit by developing separate
pennit markets to control regional externalities in conjunction with an international pennit
market to control greenhouse gas emissions.
The next section presents the basic correlated externality model with joint abatement
technology and characterizes the Pareto efficient solution. Section 3 presents the case of joint
emissions pennit markets-separate markets to control the regional externalities and one
international market to control the global externality-and shows that this mechanism is efficient
under decentralized leadership within a global federation. This section also examines the
conditions under which the efficient mechanism is implementable. Section 4 examines an
alternative mechanism-joint emissions taxes-and shows why this mechanism is inefficient under
the decentralized-leadership regime. Section 5 concludes.

2. A Correlated Externality Model
Consider a global economy consisting of J > 2 regions indexed by j, and Ij > 1 energy
finns indexed by ij in each region j. 2 Assume nj consumers are located in region j. The utility of
a representative consumer in region j is uj(Xj,yj,gj,e), where Xj, yj, gj, and e =

Le
j

j

are

respectively the quantities consumed of a numeraire good, energy, a regional pollutant, and a
global pollutant. For the sake of illustration we call the global pollutant "carbon" and the local
pollutant "smog". We assume that J is strictly quasi-concave, increasing in the first two
arguments, and decreasing in the last two arguments. Net emissions of smog and carbon are, for
example, hannful to each individual's health.

2We can think of an energy fIrm as representing any type of fIrm that produces embodied energy.
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Let net emissions of carbon in regionj be e j = Lij e jj =Lij(Yjj - (a~ + "la~ )), where Yij is
the total quantity of energy produced by energy firm ij in region j,

a~

is total amount of

abatement of eij produced by firm ij in region j, a ~ is the total amount of abatement of gij
produced by firm ij in regionj. The term ye

(0,1] represents the fraction of firm ij's abatement

effort of smog that also reduces eij. For example, ye may be the fraction of carbon emissions
removed by firm ij 's application of a jet scrubber technology to remove dust particles at level a~ .
Similarly, net emissions of smog in region j is defined as
gj = Lijgjj =Lij(Yjj - (a~ + 'Yga~ )), where in this case yg

(0,1] represents the fraction of firm ij's

abatement effort of carbon that also reduces gij. For example, yg may be the fraction of dust
particles removed by firm ij' s application of an absorption technology to remove carbon
emissions at level

a~.

To keep things simple, we normalize the price of numeraire good to one, and let rj equal
the competitively-determined price of energy in region j. Region j' s total income is represented
by
Ej

J

(1)

where x~ is an initial endowment of the numeraire good (e.g. money), n ij is energy firm ij's
profit (defined below), and'tj is the central government's transfer remitted to regionj (if positive)
or sent from region j (if negative). An example of a "central government" in the context of this
model is the Global Environmental Authority (GEF) established by the Kyoto Protocol to inter
alia effect international transfers between and within Annex I and Annex II countries. Because
the GEF's transfers are purely redistributive, Lj 7 j = o.
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Since residents are identical within each region, each consumer in region j faces a budget
constraint,

x J. + r·J y.J

= w J.In J.

t J.

(2)

J.

j
The representative consumer's problem is therefore to maximize u by choosing {Xj,Yj}
subj ect to (2), taking rj, gj, and e as given. This results in (2) and

tj

(3)

J

i.e., the standard consumer-maximization result where the marginal rate of substitution is set
equal to the inverse price ratio (subscripts denote the associated partial derivatives). Equations
(2) and (3) implicitly define the consumer's demand functions x j == x j (rj' w j' g j' e) and

Firm ij' s profit from energy production is defined as
7rij -_

rj Yij -

C ij

(yij' a ij , a ij
g

e )

h
·
. stnct
. Iy
+ P(-e ij - e ij ) + v j (-gij - gjj ) ,were
th e totaI cost f u
nctIon
c ij IS

increasing and convex in each term; p equals the price of a carbon emissions permit; Vj equals the
price of a smog permit in region j; eij is the quantity of carbon emissions permits initially
allocated to firm ij in region j as a result of negotiations among all of the regions of the
federation (L j Lij eij =

e = e); and gij is the quantity of smog permits initially allocated to firm ij

in region j by the regional government (Lij gjj

= g j = g j ). 3

Energy firm ij' s problem is therefore to maximize

1t

ij

by choosing

{Yij , a ~ , a ~ }, taking

gij' eij and all prices as given, resulting in

3We

further assume that c lyyU ( Cij g

aa

g

+ c aa
ij e e) -

(C Jy. a + CJy. a e)2
g

> 0 , which along with the quasi-concavity

condition for the representative agents' utility functions ensures concave programming problems for each of the
ensuing games analyzed below.
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(4)

which is the standard profit-maximization result associated with the choices of energy output and
abatement of smog and carbon. Equations (4) implicitly define energy firm ij' s demand

and gij == gij (rj' p, v j) as well as its indirect profit function

7r

ij

==

7r

ij

(rj' p, v j' eij , gij ).

Equilibrium clearing conditions for the regional energy markets, the regional smog
permit markets, and the carbon permit market, respectively, occur where,

t j

J

(5a)
(5b)
(5c)

representative consumers, we assume the regional governments and the GEF take {rj}j as given.
Unlike the energy firms, however, these governmental authorities have enough information to
completely internalize the effects of their policy choices of {gj}j' {ej}j' and

{7 j }j on permit

prices {v j}j and p in the environmental policy games described below.
Before we analyze the making of environmental policy, it is useful to consider the
conditions that characterize a Pareto efficient allocation. For a fixed set of social welfare weights
8 = {8j

10 < 8j < 1,

j = 1, .... J, j8j = I}, a Pareto efficient allocation can be obtained as a

solution to the following problem:

8

(A ~O)

s.t. :
The first-order conditions are (1), (2), (3),

(6)
and E j

J and E ij

1-J
(7)

(8)

(9)

Equation (6) shows that the marginal utilities of the numeraire good (normalized by the
welfare weights and populations) are equated across all regions. Equations (7}-(9) are modified
Samuelson conditions for an impure public good, equating the marginal social benefits of an
additional unit of the economic activity with its associated social marginal cost. The equality in
(7) pertains to the choice of firm ij's energy output, while the equalities in (8) and (9) pertain to
the choices of firm ij' s abatement efforts of smog and carbon, respectively. 4 Therefore,
equations (1}-(4) and (6}-(9) characterize the Pareto efficient solution.
We will now compare the efficient allocation above with an allocation that emerges from
a purely decentralized environmental policy system. Suppose the regional governments choose
their two vectors of abatement levels {a~, a~j} independently of one another, where the vectors
4Note that equations (8) and (9) imply that the familiar cost-minimization result of equalized marginal costs
of abatement across fIrms within a given region is not satisfIed by a Pareto-effIcient allocation. This result occurs
because of the joint-abatement cost confIguration of our problem.
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are defined over all finns i in regionj. To begin with, finn ij's necessary condition for profit
maximization, equation (4), becomes rj - c~

= 0, which violates efficiency condition (7). The

violation occurs because there is no mechanism (e.g. market) to induce the finn to internalize the
negative externalities associated with its energy production. From this condition, finn ij's
implicit energy supply curve can be written as Yij == Y j (rj' a~, a~). Because the regional
governments choose {a~ ,a~} independently of one another, the representative consumer's
implicit demands obtained from his utility maximization problem may be written as
Xj

_ Yj (r , w j , a ijg , a ije) .
= X j ( rj , w j , a gij , a e)
ij
an d Yj =
j

-

Regional government j' s problem is therefore,
j ((
g
e \
(
g
e \
)
Max
u x j rj , w j , a ij' a ij ;, y j rj , w j , a ij' a ij ;, g j ,e ,
{a~.IJ , a~.}
IJ

where g J. = "L..IJ.. lJ (r.J'IJ
a~,a~.)-a
a~)
IJ
IJ~ -'Vg
I
IJ and e = I·J "
L..lJ.

(Y.

(YIJ. (r.J'IJ
a~,a~.IJ )-a~lJ _'Vea lJ·
~)
I

The first

order conditions for this problem are,

. ax . .

[aY.. J .[aY..

Oy.J + U J. __IJ _ 1 + U J __lJ u J __J + U J __
x aa ~
y aa ~
g aa ~
e aa ~
lJ
IJ
IJ
lJ

r eJ=

0

,

ViElj and V jEJ (lOa)

(lOb)

Substituting the consumer's income constraint (l) into her budget constraint (2) and
differentiating with respect to a~ results in

ax . [aY.. . ay.. . JOy.

__J = r. __
IJ -clJ __
IJ -c lJ In. _r. __J
aa ~
J aa ~
y aa ~
ag
J J aa ~ ,
lJ
IJ
lJ
lJ

(11 )
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Now, we make the following three substitutions. First, substitute firm ij 's first-order
condition into (11). Second, substitute (11) into (lOa). Third, substitute into (lOa) the
representative consumer's first-order condition (3) and the energy-market equilibrium condition.
Rewriting the resulting expression we have ViE I j and V j E J ,

(12)

Repeating the same exercise for

a~

results in,

(13)

Conditions (12) and (13) violate efficiency conditions (8) and (9) because there is no
mechanism to induce the regions to account for the transboundary benefits associated with their
choices of {a~, a~ }. 5 Since the regional governments do not make interregional transfers, the
allocation also fails to satisfy efficiency condition (6). Thus, a purely decentralized
environmental policy fails on each margin except with respect to the representative consumer's
utility maximizing choice. For future reference, let {UjD}j be the set of regional welfares that
result from the purely decentralized environmental policy game.
3. Joint Emissions Permit Markets
We now analyze the allocation of resources under a game with permit markets for both
smog and carbon. This game consists of three stages. In the first stage, each regional

5Regarding region j ,s choice of

an, the mechanism would need to correct for the fact that the regional

government in a sense 'over-compensates' for the marginal effects ofeacha~ on each corresponding Yij (by the
j
j
terms (n .u g / u~ Yay. / aa~) and (n .u / u~ Yay . / aa~) in (12)). Similarly for (13) with respect to the terms
J
J\ 1J 1J
J e
J\ 1J 1J

(nju~ / u~ XaYij / aaiJ and (nju~ / u~ XaYij / aaij)'
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government agency charged with fonnulating its region's policy to control carbon-henceforth,
the "carbon agency"-decides on its initial allocation of carbon emissions pennits, taking as given
the price of energy and each other regional government's decision. Having observed the
regional governments' decisions concerning their initial carbon pennit allocations, the GEF
decides in the second stage of the game the levels of the interregional income transfers. In the
third and final stage, each regional governmental agency charged with fonnulating its region's
policy to control the local pollutant-henceforth, the "smog agency"-decides its initial allocation
across all finns ij E j

J of smog pennits, taking as given the price of energy and each other

regional government's decision. The equilibrium concept used for the game is sub-game
perfection.
It is important to note that since the GEF and the regional governmental authorities take

as given the decisions of the consumers and energy finns in each region, equations (1)-(5)
naturally obtain in this game's equilibrium.
The Third Stage of the Game
Through backward induction, we start at the last stage of the game. In this stage, region
j's smog agency choosesg j to maximize its regional welfare. Appendix 1 shows that this
decision problem results in

(14)

as well as the smog agency's pennit-allocation-response function, gj = gj (w j (e j

1ej ), E j

J.

Equations (14) reveal that each smog agency chooses the level of smog up to the point where the
price of a pennit just equals the value of the region's aggregate welfare loss associated with an
additional unit of smog. The regional markets for smog therefore work as they should-the
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equilibrium price of a permit reflects the social marginal damage associated with an additional
unit of smog in each respective region.
The Second Stage of the Game
In this stage, we assume that the GEF's objective function is a weighted global welfare

function as follows:

W({u j})= Lj8juj(xj(Wj' gj(wj1e1Yj(wj,gj(wj1e1gj(wj1e1
that is, the same objective function of the Pareto efficiency problem examined above. 6 The GEF
takes {rj , x j' y j' Yij' a~, a~, gj' e}j as given and chooses the set
to

Lj't j

{7j }j to maximize W( {uj }) subject

=0 and
(15)

Equations (15) represent the participation constraints for this game. Voluntary
participation is necessary for the effectiveness of the game's agreement. Since there is potential
for the agreement to Pareto improve upon the status quo, all participation constraints may be
satisfied nonbinding in the sub-game perfect equilibrium for this game. If the equilibrium
allocation is Pareto efficient, there will be a range of

e values under which all regions will be

strictly better offby participating in the agreement.
We shall make it our working hypothesis that the participation constraints are satisfied
slack in the equilibrium for the second stage and later show that this is indeed a possibility.
We now make two important observations about the GEF's problem. First, it is
straightforward to show that we can substitute
constraint

L

j

't j

{Wj} j

for {'tj} j as the GEF's choice set. The

= 0 can therefore be rewritten as

6Energy prices {rj}j have been suppressed in the implicit functions for each regionj.
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Second, inspection of the first order conditions reveals that the GEF's transfer-response
functions depend solely upon changes in the level of the global externality. Hence, the implicit
function theorem enables us to write w j == w j (e), t j

J. 7

As shown in Appendix 1, differentiation of the global resource constraint yields

I

J

dw . = + .v .[ __
dg J. + __
dg.J _
dw.
_
J
de
p I J J de dw j de .

.__
J
J

(16)

The terms on the right-hand side of (16) capture the effects of an additional carbon permit on the
value of carbon and smog (aggregated over all regions), respectively. Note that in a sub-game
perfect equilibrium, the GEF is aware of (or correctly guesses) the permit allocation responses of
each of the smog agencies. Equation (16) will be used later to show that the sub-game perfect
equilibrium for this game is indeed efficient.
Also shown in Appendix 1, the GEF's choice of interregional transfers satisfies (6). It
therefore redistributes the numeraire good among the regions through its transfer mechanism up
to the point where the marginal utilities of the numeraire good (normalized by the welfare
weights in its maximization problem) are equal across the regions.
The First Stage of the Game
In this stage, regionj's carbon agency chooses e j to maximize its regional welfare. In

doing so, the carbon agency correctly guesses the GEF's transfer-response function for its
region, as well as the smog agency's permit-allocation response function. As shown in
Appendix 1, the carbon agency's problem results in,

7A simple example is worked out in Appendix 2 for the case of two regions, where the transfer-response
functions are instead calculated directly.
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(17)

Equations (17) reveal that each carbon agency chooses the level of the carbon emissions
up to the point where the price of a permit just equals the value of the global welfare loss
associated with an additional unit of carbon. The market for carbon therefore works as it
should-the equilibrium price of a permit reflects the global marginal damage associated with an
additional unit of carbon.
The following proposition summarizes the results of the equilibrium analysis.
Proposition 1: Provided the solutions to the maximization problems are interior and the
participation constraints are satisfied slack, the subgame perfect equilibrium for joint emissions
permit markets is Pareto efficient.
Proof: First, note that equations (1)-(6) hold for the game. Substituting equations (14) and (17)
recursively into the three equalities of equations (4) for each respective region results in
equations (7)-(9). Therefore, each of the necessary and sufficient conditions for a Pareto
efficient solution is satisfied for this game.
Proposition 1 tells us that the redistributive transfers implemented by the GEF, in concert
with an international permit market for carbon and separate smog permit markets, are powerful
enough to nullify each region's incentive to ignore the negative externalities caused by its own
emissions. Since the modified Samuelson conditions are satisfied in the equilibrium of the game,
equations (14) and (17) clearly demonstrate that each firm in each respective region faces its set
of Lindahl prices when it chooses how much carbon and smog to emit (these prices are the
carbon and smog permit prices, respectively). This implies that each firm (and thus each region)
has no unilateral incentive to deviate from fully internalizing both the regional and global
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externalities. The mechanism therefore induces not only an efficient allocation of carbon and
smog, but it is also self-enforcing.
It is important to point out that Proposition 1 holds if the participation constraints are

satisfied slack in equilibrium. Since the purely decentralized (i.e., status quo) allocation is
inefficient and the equilibrium allocation for this game is efficient when the participation
constraints are ignored, there exists a range of 8 values under which all regions can be made
better offby participating in the game-i.e., the equilibrium allocation is such that each region's
welfare is not less than its purely decentralized welfare UjD . We shall assume henceforth that the
designers of the game-that is, the regional governments themselves-agree before ratification on
a distribution of 8 parameters that will make all regions better off upon completion of the game.
Such an agreement may emerge, for example, from a Nash bargaining game played by the
regions prior to the commencement of the game.
In two closely related studies, Caplan, et al. (2002) and Caplan and Silva (2002) examine

a noncooperative "global warming game" where carbon emissions and international transfers are
determined. 8 As in this paper, they assume that there is an international agency in charge of
implementing redistributive transfers across nations. Caplan and Silva (2002) is mostly
concerned with examining the efficiency and implementability properties of an international
transfer mechanism that obeys a predetermined "proportional equity" principle. They find that a
proportional equity scheme is Pareto efficient. While their model allows for commodity trading,
it does not allow for emissions trading. Caplan, et al. (2002) allow for both commodity and
emissions trading, and show that the ensuing equilibrium is efficient. These studies, however, do
not consider the correlation of regional and global externalities.

8Chichilnisky, et al. (2000) arrive at a similar result, where the GEF determines an ex ante initial allocation
of permits rather than ex post international transfers.
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4. Joint Emissions Taxes
Although a "harmonized" set of emissions taxes can be set exogenously (i.e. without the
guarantee of self-enforcement) by the regions to simultaneously control for the global and
regional externalities, the more important question of whether a joint set of taxes endogenously
(i.e., with the guarantee of self-enforcement) leads to a Pareto efficient allocation of the
externalities E similar to the joint permit markets described above-has yet to be investigated.
It is easy to see that if the carbon agencies agree to exogenously set

(18)
and each of the smog agencies exogenously set
J

(19)

then, using the energy firms' corresponding optimality conditions

(20)

the modified Samuelson conditions (7)-(9) obtain. Indeed, given (20), (18) and (19) are the
unique tax rules that result in conditions (7)-(9), similar in nature to the tax rules derived in Hoel
(1992) and Michaelis (1992).
However, as Chichilnisky, et al. (2000) have also shown, there is no mechanism in place
to satisfy condition (6). Thus, the Pareto efficient allocation itself does not necessarily obtain.
Moreover, nothing ensures that each region j will in fact find it desirable to implement (18) and
(19) on its own.
The problem with joint emissions taxes unfortunately does not stop there. Endogenizing
the tax instruments in a mechanism similar to that described for the joint permit markets in
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Section 3 does not restore Pareto efficiency. As Appendix 3 shows, the mechanism provides
incorrect incentives to each region with respect to their choices of the tax instruments. Despite
the fact that an efficient allocation of the numeraire good is restored, the respective tax rules do
not engender the regions' respective Lindahl prices, i.e. they do not satisfy conditions (18) and
(19). Thus, the allocations of carbon and smog are inefficient. In particular, under joint taxation
we obtain the following rules,

J

e _

t. - -

n jU!
.

J

J

U

x

A

[r;g

j

.

t

e

zJ
tg

+1

1

, Ej

J

(21)

(22)

where, as shown in Appendix 3, the terms r~g and Z~g are linear combinations of the respective

effects of a unit change in

tf on the levels ofYij , a~, and a~, and A ~e

is a linear combination of

the effects of a change in t ~ on Yij, a~, and a~.
J

Our second main result is therefore immediate.
Proposition 2: The subgame perfect equilibrium for joint emissions taxes is inefficient.
Proof: Substituting equations (21) and (22) recursively into the three equalities of equations

(20) for each respective region does not result in equations (7)-(9).
What drives the inefficiency result of Proposition 2 is the simple fact that with taxes there
are no market-clearing conditions to effectively "bound" the myriad marginal effects of
respective changes in t~ (in stage 3) and t ~ (in stage 1) on Y ij , a~, and a~, as there are in the
J

J

case of conditions (16) and (17) for the smog and carbon permit markets (see Appendix 1 for the
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derivations of these two conditions). Without these bounding effects provided by the separate
permit markets, both the smog and carbon agencies in each region lack the proper incentives to
set their respective tax rates at efficient levels, even though the GEF ' s transfer policy is both
efficient and responsive to the agencies' tax-rate choices. In particular, without the quantity
constraint at the global level (for carbon) being chosen directly by the regions themselves, the
property of "incentive equivalence"-where each region is constrained by its overall effect on its
neighboring regions-is lost.
5. Conclusions

This paper represents an initial step in comparing the effectiveness of permit markets and
emissions taxes to control correlated externalities with joint abatement technology when control
over the relevant policy instruments is shared by a hierarchy of independent governments and
governmental agencies. Perhaps most restrictive is the full-information sub-game equilibrium
concept used to determine the model ' s outcomes. Future research might therefore incorporate
both uncertainty and alternative game-theoretic equilibrium concepts in order to further test the
robustness of the paper's main finding that joint permit markets are Pareto efficient and selfenforcing under jurisdictional competition, while joint emissions taxes are not.
Restrictive though the general framework for this paper is, several features of the model
reflect a realistic picture of the constraints inherent in the control of transboundary pollution
problems. Foremost among these constraints are the correlated nature of regional and global
pollutants, technologies that provide various degrees of joint abatement, and the inescapable fact
that a hierarchy of governmental institutions-often with competing objectives-are jointly
responsible for enacting the policies and enforcement mechanisms that ultimately determine the
levels at which these pollution problems are controlled. Having forgotten these constraints,
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proponents of "harmonized" or "multiple" emissions taxes may be overlooking a crucial
objective, that market-based mechanisms not only induce an efficient outcome, but also one that
is self-enforcing.
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Appendix 1
At the outset, note that the respective energy finns' and representative consumers'
problems for this mechanism are as derived in the text. Thus, conditions (I)-(5c) hold in
equilibrium. We therefore begin our fonnal analysis with the smog agency j' s decision problem
in stage three,

which results in the first-order conditions,

. ax.
xa-gj

. 8y .

.

Ya-gj

g

uJ_J+uJ_J+uJ=O

,

EJ·

J

(AI)

Now, consider the budget constraint for the representative consumer in region j,

where w j is defined according to (1). Using this definition, the fact that

clearing condition for the local pennit market (5b) obtains when we add up for the consumer's
income constraint (l), total differentiation of (AI) results in,
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aa~

i3

aa~ 8v j

ap

= ---- + - - - - . Substitution of the finns' first-order conditions (4) and the local

'It .

ap ag j

J

8v j

ag j

pennit market-clearing condition totally differentiated with respect to gj into this expression
results in

ax .
a-gj

v·

_ J =_J

8y .
_r._J
J

nj

J.

a-gj , tJ·

Substituting this expression into (AI), recognizing the consumer's first-order condition (3), and
rearranging tenns results in (14).
In stage 2, the GEF solves the following maximization problem,

with first order conditions for an interior solution,

g

g
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Totally differentiating (2) with respect to {Wj}j implies
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(6).

J

-.

tJ

J. Substituting these results into (A2) results in
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Based on (A3), we may write

L j (x ~ + Lij

ij
7r

w · = w . (e)
]
]

Ej

J. Thus, (A3) may be re-written as,

(gl (w 1(e),e) ... ,g] (w J (e),e) e)) = L j W j (e). Totally differentiating this expression

with respect to

e results in,

where

E j,k

J, j k,

E j,k

J, j k.

Substituting into this expression conditions (4) and the respective total differentiations of (5b)
and (5c) with respect to e results in,

aw·]

[ag ]O ago] aw ]'J
] ] ae aw. ae

Lj--=p+L:·v. -=-+--_- ,

ae

which is (16) in the text.

]

(A4)
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In stage 1, the carbon agency in regionj faces the same objective function as did the

smog agency in stage 2, except that it maximizes its objective function with respect to ej , rather
than gj. Recalling (Sc), the first-order condition for this problem may be written as,
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Totally differentiating the representative consumer's budget constraint with respect
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J;r.,.2
-'¥
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J- , t J

Jo Substituting this expression, (3), and

J

(Sa) into (A8) and rearranging results in,

J

(A6)

Summing (A6) over allj, setting this sum equal to (A4), and substituting in equations (16) results
in (17).
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Appendix 2
In this appendix we provide a simple two-region, two-firm example of the joint permit

model described in Section 3, and show the conditions under which an interior solution is
obtained. The consumer in region j, j=I,2, is characterized by the utility function

= a j (In x j + In y

u j

_J_J - _ J _ ,

ij
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and the remaining variables and parameters are as defined in Section 2. The profit function for
firm i in region j, inclusive of its specified joint cost function, is
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where all of the remaining variables and parameters are as defined in Section 2. Together, the
representative consumers' utility functions and the firms' profit functions define concave
programming problems under both the Pareto efficient and mechanism scenarios. It is now
straightforward to show that the Pareto efficient solution satisfies the following conditions,
=
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(B5)

Note that (B1) corresponds to (6), (B2) to (3), and (B3)-(B5) to (7)-(9). Market-clearing
conditions (5a)-(5c) also hold.
For the joint permit mechanism, the energy firms' respective profit maximization
problems result in,
a~ -v·

P=fj -Yj -2Yij =

1J

J

=aij -'YrYj

(B6)

i=1,2 andj=1,2,

'Yj

which corresponds to (4). The representative consumers' problems result in (B2) and their
respective budget constraints.
In the third stage, the local pollutant agency in region 1 solves,

resulting in the first-order condition
(B7a)
Similarly for region 2,
(B7b)
Note that (B7a) and (B7b) correspond to conditions (14) and respectively define each region's
domestic-permit-allocation response function
and (B7b) with respect to

1"j

and

ej

results in

gj

= gj (7 j (e j

1e j ).

Totally differentiating (B7a)
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(B8)

In the second stage of the game, the GEF solves,
{3 ·e- 7
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J J
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which results in the first-order condition,

Substituting (B7a) and (B7b) into this expression results in (Bl). From (Bl), the
following expressions for the GEF's transfer-response functions can be derived after applying
(B8),

(B9a)

(B9b)

From (B9a) and (B9b) we note that,
(BIO)

Finally, in the first stage, the global pollutant agencies choose ej to solve the same
objective function as the local pollutant agencies, accounting for both

gj

= gj (7) (e j

1e

j )

and
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T]

=

T]

(eJ, j=I,2. Using (B7a) and (B7b), the first-order conditions for this problem may be

written for regions 1 and 2, respectively, as,
(Blla)

(Bllb)

Substituting (B9a) and (B 10) into (B 11 a) and rearranging results in

(BI2a)

Similarly, substituting (B9b) and (BI0) into (Bllb) and rearranging results in,

n x

e

{32 2 2
= --'-----=-----=--

82 a 2

(BI2b)

Appealing to (Bl), it is clear from (BI2a) and (BI2b) that it is unnecessary for the two
regions to be symmetrical for an interior solution to hold. Thus, the Chiappori and Werning
(2002) critique of these types of games does not hold in this particular case.
Now, summing the equations in (Blla) and (Bllb) together, and applying (BI0) results
In
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Lj

[3 ·n ·x·e
J

J

J

•

(J.

J

Combining (B7a), (B7b), and (BI3) recursively with (B6) results in (B3)-(BS).

(BI3)
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Appendix 3
To begin, note that with joint taxes firm ij' s profit function is the same as defined in
Section 2 for joint permits, except that the tax rate on regionj's smog, t~, replaces its regional
J

permit price Vj, and the tax rate on regionj's carbon, t ~, replaces the global permit price p. As a
J

result, firm ij's first-order conditions may be written as,
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The representative consumer's problem in regionj again results in (3), which defines

smog emissions (t~ go) and carbon (t ~ e.) in regionj are returned lump sum to that region's
J J

J J

representative consumer. The GEF continues to make budget-balanced transfers 't"j to the
representative consumers in regions j. The consumer's income constraint (1) may therefore be
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markets are eliminated, thus market-clearing conditions (5b) and (5c) are non-extant. However,

30
the energy market equilibrium (Sa) solves for rj, E j
induces a re-writing of the implicit expressions for

J. As in Appendix 1, this expression

{x j' Yj ' Y ij , a~ , aij ,g j ' eJ.IJ., J. accordingly.

In stage 3, the smog agency in regionj solves the problem,
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approach as followed to derive (14) in Appendix A, (C2) can be rewritten as
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It is readily apparent that the GEF's problem in stage 2 is unchanged with joint taxes.

Thus, we obtain condition (6). However, rather than evaluate how a given region's choice of its
endowment of carbon (and thus the level of the global endowment) affects the global resource
constraint, we must evaluate how a given region's choice ifits tax rate t ~ affects its own
J

consumer's income constraint, which is itself endogenous to the effect of t ~ on the incomes of all
J

other regions j

k

J
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Substitution of (Cl) into (C4) results in,

(C4)

In stage 1, the carbon agency in region j solves the same problem as the smog agency did
in stage 3, except that it chooses t e rather than t~. This results in the first-order condition,
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ay . Using the same approach as
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followed to derive (A6) in Appendix A, (C6) may be rewritten as
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Setting this expression equal to (C4) and recalling (17) results in (22), where
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